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Abstract-As intelligence technology advances from problem specific to adaptive de- 
signs it is conceivable that design concepts will be found in analytic psychology. This 
psychology features a mechanistic and structured model of human adaptivity from 
which such concepts may derive. This paper develops this position and illustrates it 
with three examples: the von Neumann machine, digital simulation of dreams, and 
digital simulation of the mechanism of the creative process. The simulating algorithms 
of the last two examples are implemented in Fortran. 
PART A 
Introduction 
A great deal of cybernetic research is based upon a quasiliteral replication of biological 
structure and function; prosthetic limbs, synthetic knee joints, artificial kidney and heart 
experiments are examples of this. Clearly, a well defined knowledge of both structure 
and function is prerequisite to such pursuits. If man is partitioned as an adaptive organism 
into biological and psychological domains then it becomes clear that biophysical struc- 
ture/function information is available for the biological, while only modelled (represen- 
tational) structure /function information is available for the psychological. 
Freud came to terms with this limitation in the late nineteenth century. His first ap- 
proach in investigating neurotic and psychotic disorders was to search for specific causes 
such as toxins, infections, congenital predisposition, and the like. He even attempted to 
account for these dysfunctions with a general model of neuronal function in 1895 (entitled 
Project for a Scientific Psychology; with this work Freud renounced the purely organic 
approach to the psychoneuroses). The outcome of his research was to abandon a literal 
biological or chemical approach in favor of what evolved into an informational one: Freud 
slowly realized that while biochemistry defines the human potential for life and adaptivity 
it is the relationship of the infant human to the surroundings that determines how efficient 
and well-organized the results of biochemical maturation are. This in turn led to a struc- 
ture/function theory of human adaptive (and hence also maladaptive) behavior whose 
primitive terms were not literally biological but metabiological. If the state of scientific 
knowledge could not afford biochemical identification of life and adaptive processes, 
direct observation could still afford a structured model for the results of such processes, 
these results being adaptivity. 
There are sound historical reasons for analytic psychology lending itself readily to 
mathematical description. As a product of late nineteenth century science, Freud re- 
garded that science as complete which resolved its object into well-defined-preferably 
quantifiable-forces and mechanisms. In an epoch of thermodynamic elaboration, he 
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studied at the Helmholtz School of Physics and Physiology. It is therefore appropriate 
that analytic psychology is characterized at the macroscopic level by references to work, 
energy, force, and mechanism. However, the work/energy concepts of thermodynamics 
are readily related through entropy to information theory (the thermodynamic-information 
analogy through entropy was not developed until the 1940’s by C. E. Shannon at Bell 
Telephone Laboratories; note that Freud died in 1939). Hence, it appears natural that 
analytic psychology should lend itself to mathematical (informational) models. 
Analytic psychology can be characterized as a mechanistic effort to account for human 
adaptivity and its failures. This includes the concept of ontogenesis, i.e., the development 
from birth onward of these adaptive capacities. It is a model of an informational type 
which at any point in time measures the personality’s health (and hence efficiency) by its 
degree of organization. The following thought experiment will perhaps clarify the per- 
spective of analytic psychology: suppose a device, say X, exhibited adaptive capacities 
and that a systems engineer was given the task of deducing the algorithms (or informa- 
tional models) that .Y employed to achieve its decisions and actions; assuming that the 
engineer deduced the algorithms with sufficient accuracy the result would be analogous 
to the analytic model of adaptive personality. If now a mature and healthy human sub- 
stitutes for x and an analytic psychologist for the engineer the analogy becomes rather 
reasonable. 
If therefore this model is faithful-as far as it has been developed-to the information 
content of adaptive behavior and if this model is mathematically identifiable then the 
following question presents itself: can a mathematical description of this model (a math- 
ematical representation of the information content of the analytic adaptive model) be used 
to suggest designs in artificial intelligence? The question appears reasonable when con- 
sidering that intelligence is only a part of any adaptive paradigm; indeed what character- 
izes human adaptivity-and no human invention to date -is elasticity of adaptive capac- 
ity. Man unlike any human invention to date is not problem specific in design. 
The perspective of this paper is that it may be reasonable to anticipate structured 
conceptual approaches to artificial intelligence evolving from models of the type referred 
to above. The point of departure is that while a science like bionics builds on literal 
recapitulation of parts, the present approach suggests building on recapitulation of infor- 
mational structure and function. This means more than replicating information content 
because it includes replicating information structure: in a word, it builds on information 
plus organization. 
The next section of this paper will attempt to present this concept more sharply. Rather 
than presenting a systematized version of analytic psychology-which space precludes- 
the format for this paper is to define the notion of source concepts for artificial intelligence 
(AI) in analytic psychology and to then illustrate this. Three examples follow and together 
with each is hopefully adequate analytic material to make the derivation of the AI concept 
from analytic material clear. The examples are the von Neumann concept of the com- 
puter, digital simulation of dreams, and digital simulation of the mechanism of the creative 
process (with an illustration). It is actually necessary to present the second example 
because, as intuition suggests, the third one subsumes it. The simulating algorithms of 
examples two and three are then implemented in Fortran. 
Human adaptivity as the primitive model 
Historically analytic psychology investigated the development (ontogenesis) of human 
sexuality and aggression as the ultimate sources of neurotic and psychotic disorders. The 
outcome has been a model of healthy (ideal) human adaptivity derived from studies of 
unhealthy, often extreme, adaptations. The key to this perspective is an appropriate 
definition of sexuality: sexuality denotes the human drive to survive in the individual or 
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collective (species) sense. The mental apparatus-termed the ego in Freud’s model- 
which enables securing specific adaptive measures is enlisted by sexual strivings in this 
sense. 
The ideal model of human adaptivity refers, of course, to the mature adult state. The 
historical studies of infantile sexuality were motivated by quests for the earliest sources 
of suboptimal maturation to the adult state. In a strict sense the study of infantile sexuality 
is a study of system initialization and transient to steady state where system refers to 
adaptive personality. If AI is to be served by psychoanalytic paradigms then they will 
probably derive from the ideal (adult) model. This, of course, raises an interesting 
question: is it possible to design and implement a system which fully recapitulates (em- 
ulates) a psychic subsystem which is itself achieved through a maturing process? Would 
the recapitulate also have to mature to completion ? The answer is no, in general, as 
example one below illustrates. 
Henceforth, let us restrict the concept of adaptivity to the psychological (informational) 
domain; this allows nonreference to those somatic capacities enlisted in carrying out the 
adaptive decisions (such as limbs, senses, etc.) and narrows the focus to how we originate 
our adaptive decisions. In other words, our attention is henceforth restricted to structure/ 
function concepts on information and organization as seen in the analytic model. A 
qualitative paradigm for seeking AI concepts in analytic psychology suggests itself if the 
original problem in AI is suitably posed. Let P denote the original problem definition and 
S a solution (note that the mapping from problems to solutions is, in general, a one-to- 
many mapping and could even be a many-to-many mapping). In accordance with systems 
terminology let H denote the transfer function which associates (“carries P into S”) P 
with S: H(P) = S . Before outlining the paradigm some examples will perhaps clarify the 
meaning of H: 
(1) P = find the roots of a quadratic, 
s = the roots to a reasonable approximation, 
H = the quadratic formula; 
(2) P = to order a list, 
S = the ordered list, 
H= an appropriate algorithm such as bubble sort; 
(3) P = translate French into English, 
s = a suitable rendering, 
H = find someone (perhaps oneself) fluent in both languages; 
(4) P = form a prespecified sequence of arithmetic and logical operations on a set of 
data, 
S = output of the results in appropriate media and format, 
H = described below under the von Neumann machine. 
The first two examples have unique solutions, the third and fourth do not. These 
examples suggest that H may be a formula, an algorithm, or a procedure; in general H 
is a transformation on information. The intent here is to suggest how H can be concep- 
tualized from analytic models when P and S are specified, it being assumed that P and 
S are appropriate from the outset. Examples 1 and 2 illustrate inappropriateness because 
the procedure (H) is problem specific and hence purely cognitive. Analytic psychology 
would bk of no avail here. It is in the pursuit of devices and methods whose problem 
solving domain is more general (adaptivity) that this model may be of help. The human 
cognitive power is, in a sense, a primitive of the model; it is its relatedness to pre- and 
noncognitive processes within the personality that gives it relevance and utility in this 
model. To be sure, AI will profit greatly by exploring cognition but it will not broach 
adaptivity and generalization of function through cognition alone. 
A hypothetical situation may clarify this: suppose it were possible to fully replicate 
human cognition. Would all problems then be solvable? No, for the simple reason that 
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not all problems are cognitive and further the full solution to any problem almost always 
has cognitive plus noncognitive dimensions. A person who is learning impaired for emo- 
tional reasons illustrates this rather well (the emotional problem is not removable by a 
cognitive process alone). The problem of designing a device to optically scan written text 
successfully also illustrates this: the variety of representations of the letter (I, for example, 
is not deducable from cognition alone because individual variations derive from affectual 
states (for present purposes, affect may be defined as a generalization of emotion with 
emphasis on total biological response). The distinction made here is between intelligence 
(cognition) and adaptivity; the latter both includes and generalizes the former. This is not 
to intimate that H may be suggested by examining the relation of intelligence to adaptivity 
but rather that it (H) may be suggested by relating P and S to appropriate analogues in 
the adaptive model where cognition is a primitive. 
The paradigm can be stated as follows: 
(1) In the original problem define P and S ; 
(2) Generalize P, if necessary, to its corresponding class of adaptive demands; gen- 
eralize S accordingly; calI these P* and S*; 
(3) Determine by reference to the adaptive model the form of H* for which H*(P*) 
(4) ipz&ize H * to H such that H(P) = S . 
The idea of solving a problem by scrutinizing how we ourselves spontaneously (un- 
consciously) solve it is not original; systems experts and applied scientists have long been 
doing it in constructing algorithms. The point of departure is that most replication has 
been of cognitive processes alone and hence the results have tended to be problem spe- 
cific. Generalizing the problem to adaptive analogues and reapplying the process of ex- 
amining how we ourselves achieve a solution is to tend toward adaptivity and therefore 
to elasticity of solution (H*). 
H * will be presented explicitly in the three examples cited. The approach is conceptual 
with limited use of symbolic representation which is unavoidable in the second and es- 
pecially in the third example. 
Example 1: The von Neumann machine 
Referring back to example 4, the P that the digital computer (von Neumann machine) 
resolves may be stated “to perform a prespecified sequence of arithmetic and logical 
operations on a set of data” and S may be stated “to output the results in appropriate 
media and format.” For the moment we can say H(P) = S, where H is a von Neumann 
machine. The goal here is to show how H is abstractable from the analytic model when 
P and S are suitably generalized. Figure 1 summarizes the organization of the von Neu- 
mann machine. 
In this model a program queues on an input channel and requests machine resources 
for execution; when these are available the program is translated, loaded, and executed. 
This last phase sees the program control system (machine) resources while executing 
from main memory and under the constraints of the control unit. Upon completion results 
are directed to an output channel. The program is internally stored, may be self-modifying 
and may perform arithmetic or logical decisions which either compute functions of the 
data or store the data or both transform and store the data. This paragraph is a summary 
of H conceived at the design level. No reference to Boolean logic for circuit synthesis 
nor to circuit elements for circuit realization has been made. The level of presentation is 
the design level. It is interesting to note here that the von Neumann design has survived 
the vicissitudes of materials technology: generation 1 (vacuum tubes); generation 2 (tran- 
sistors); generation 3 (integrated circuits); etc. 




Fig. 1. The organization of the digital computer with control and computational (ALU) units segregated. Dashed 
lines indicate flow of control information. Solid lines indicate flow of data. 
Analytic psychology has a conceptually simple model for adaptive functioning from 
which the von Neumann design is abstractable. The primitive terms are id, ego, and 
superego. The id is defined as the seat of human instincts, both sexual and aggressive. 
The ego is defined as an organizational structure which mediates the aims of id instincts 
subject to the constraints of external reality and of internal reality (superego). The su- 
perego is defined as an ego overseer derived from introjection of parental (familial) values; 
it is equitable with the “do-don’t” values of the parents. Historically the superego has 
the (external) parents as its precursor; normal development sees ego regulation increas- 
ingly defined by internalized parental values. The resulting internalized psychic agency 
is the superego. The ego then in the mature state has three boundaries or interfaces: the 
id, the superego, and external reality; the first two are internal. Furthermore, the ego 
develops ontogenetically from the id out toward reality where id promptings can be 
satisfied. 
With these primitive terms an adaptive model is now presentable. An adaptive measure 
originates as an id impulse-which may arise spontaneously as hunger or in response to 
a percept such as the sight of food-seeking to secure its object by enlisting the powers 
of the ego. The ego acts to master external reality in accordance with (i) the nature of 
the id impulse, (ii) the constraints of external reality, and (iii) the constraints of the 
superego. Let P* = secure satisfaction of an id impulse, S* = mastery of reality in favor 
of the id impulse, then H* is ego reaction to P* subject to the feedback regulated con- 
straints of external reality and superego. The remainder of this example outlines the 
specialization of H * to H . 
In this framework we can say that the stored program is in relation to input, to ALU, 
to control, and to output as ego procedure is to id, to ego capacity, to both superego and 
external reality, and to reality modifying action. Explicitly, the analogies are id/input, 
ego procedure/stored program, ego capacity/ALU, superego + external reality/control, 
and reality modifying action/output. Figure 2 compares the event sequences associated 
with H and If*. Note that if control is conceptualized as hardware + software (operating 
system) then the following analogues obtain superego/hardware control, external reality/ 
software control (= operating system) because the operating system is external to the 
program. 
It is perhaps worth mentioning that memory is a patent recapitulation of human mem- 
ory, and that the execution state achieved by serially decoding instructions is the analogue 
of conscious cognition which is also characterized by serial processing (of sensory and 
recalled data) and thus by flux. There are more ways in which the von Neumann design 
is a specialized recapitulation of the analytic model for adaptive response (see ill) 
however what is outlined here is the essence of the analogy that pairs H(P) = S with 
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H 
input program seeks 
access to system 
resources 
(wait for priority) 
translation, loading 
into main memory 
execution ‘subject to 
control + resource 
constraints 
1 
result = output 
H* 
id impulse seeks 
access to ego 
capacities 
(wait for priority) 
interpretation, 




superego + reality 
constraints 
result = discharge of 
instinctual energy + 
potential satisfaction 
Fig. 2. H and H* for the von Neumann machine. 
H*(P*) = S*. Finally, the self-modifying code is the analogue of feedback regulated 
adaptive response (the ego is so regulated by the three boundaries of id, superego, and 
external reality but especially by external reality which is dynamic in contrast to the 
relatively stable contents of the id and superego). 
PART B 
Introduction 
The first part of this paper suggested that the informational structure of analytic psy- 
chology may lend itself to formulating solutions to problems in artificial intelligence. if 
the source problem and solution are P and S then it was suggested that (1) P and S could 
be generalized to appropriate classes of adaptive demands P* and adaptive solutions S*, 
(2) reference to the analytic model may provide a transfer function H* such that H*(P) 
= S*, and (3) the transfer function H for which H(P) = S could be determined by 
specialization of H *. 
This was illustrated with the von Neumann machine. The second part of this paper 
will further illustratie the above approach with simulations of dream formation and of the 
mechanism of creativity. A transfer function H for each of these problems is constructed 
by reference to the analytic model. A later section of this part presents a single simulator, 
implemented in Fortran, for both of these problems. This is appropriate because of the 
natural relation that prevails between dreaming and creativity. The simulator though 
rudimentary is designed to accommodate the improvements suggested in the examples 
below. 
Example 2: Simulating dream formation 
It is worthwhile to examine dream formation because the dream mechanism which in 
and of itself has considerable adaptive significance and value is closely related to crea- 
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tivity which is the root of all progress in man’s adaptation. Let P = construct an algorithm 
to simulate the dream process, S = presentation of the result. As previously, we want 
that H for which H(P) = S . Let then P* = dream synthesis, S* = dream experience, 
then H*(P*) = S* if H* is the mechanism of the dream process. 
Only a part of the theory of dream formation is necessary for this. Dreams originate 
as psychic efforts to achieve satisfaction of wishful tendencies either disallowed in waking 
life or unachievable for real reasons in the waking state. Let the driving wish be W. Now 
W has both cognitive (literal) valence and affectual valence: it is the achievement of the 
affectual valence of W that drives the dream process. Let A = {a} be the set of significant 
affects associated with W. The dream work essentially proceeds by taking elements of 
A, say u, and associating them with cognitive values, say W*, other than W which also 
carry the affectual valence N. That is W # W* but W and W* share Q though not 
necessarily at the same level of intensity. The objective of the dream mechanism is to 
synthesize a scenario-which is actually a hallucination because it is a fiction experienced 
as a fact-which satisfies W yet escapes anxiety because of superego or reality con- 
straints. This is essentially achieved by relocating the significant affects A that W de- 
mands onto other cognitive values W* and to then link the resulting W*‘s into a cohesive 
whole, a process referred to as secondary revision. The relocation of affect mechanisms 
are generally regarded as distortion, displacement, and condensation which mean what 
they suggest excepting condensation which refers to one symbol W* carrying two or 
more affects relocated from W. For present purposes all the mechanisms prior to sec- 
ondary revision can be subsumed under the mechanism of relocation of affect. 
This is enough to itemize the event sequence of dream information: 
(1) W is defined with cognitive and affectual valence, i.e., W is defined as the sum of 
its cognitive and affectual attributes (a cognitive attribute is defined here as a 
descriptive phase). 
(2) Each significant affect Q of W is relocated to a W* where W # W* but W* has 
affect a among its associated affects. 
(3) If the cognitive valence of W* is too near W then W* is rejected (superego). 
Another W* is chosen not so near W. 
(4) The visual percepts associated with the W*‘s are linked serially or simultaneously 
according to which link maximizes cognitive difference from W. 
Steps 1-4 are a simplified but accurate enough accounting of H*. Constructing H is now 
a revision of these steps within the constraints of the current capacities for digital 
simulation: 
(1) Define W as W = {IZ’~}, where each M’] is a cognitive attribute of W and define 
{ CJ~} as the affectual attributes of W. 
(2) For each uk define Wk = {M’k,}, where each w k, is a cognitive attribute that has 
affect ak associated with it. Note that it may be the case that M’k, e W. 
(3) Let W. = U Wk and define d: W. x W + R, i.e., d(w1,w2) is a real number that 
measures, in an assigned sense ultimately based on human response, how near 
cognitive attribute MJ~ (one of the h’kI’s) is to some w2 E W. 
(4) For each ak choose that M’k, which maximizes 
min d( wk, ,wj) 
k,#j 
as j exhausts W. Note that wk, must satisfy the condition 
min d(wkl,wj) > ikf, 
k,#j 
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where M measures distance from W cognitively and hence is a function of superego 
pressure and/or reality. If there are two or more such w&$‘s choose the first. If 
some wk, ITIaXhiZeS d for more than one ok this iS acceptable and corresponds to 
condensation. Choose an object, say WZ, that has attribute wk,. If there is more 
than one such object choose the one that carries the least number of wJ’s; if this 
causes a tie choose the first such (minimizing) object. 
The resulting set of W$‘s are the literal elements of the dream and the output. If their 
natural serial order is nonsensical then that is appropriate to dream simulation. Note that 
maximizing d corresponds to avoiding superego pressure as well as avoiding iteration in 
step 4 of the definition of H. In a more general model the maximum criterion of step 4 
would be replaced by a threshold criterion dependent on each ak. The mapping from 
affect (of W) to cognate (of a W*) is the relocation mechanism. The second set of four 
steps given is a specialization of H* to H and is a solution of the problem of simulating 
dreams. 
Example 3: Simulating the mechanism of the creative process 
Creative work is a close cousin of dreaming and were it not for constraints on the 
creative process derived from fidelity to reality the two processes would be identical. In 
fact if the reality constraint were removed from conscious creativity the result would be 
a hallucination, a fact that accords well with the traditional tendency to link creativity 
and madness. In the present context let P = find an algorithmic approximation to human 
adaptive response, and let S = a simulatable algorithm. By generalization let P* = 
response (intrapsychic, creative) to an adaptive demand, and S* = resulting (manifest) 
adaptive action. As previously the goal is to find in the analytic model an H* for which 
H*(P*) = S* and to then determine H with H(P) = S by specialization. Note the 
tautology: adaptive response = creativity. 
Creative response as dreaming begins with a wishful tendency (W): the wish to resolve 
(successfully) an adaptive demand. This relates creativity to dreaming in no small way. 
The class of processes that operate (unconsciously) in dream formation are referred to 
as the primary process. They are characterized by prelogic where, for example, two 
distinct cognates, say x and y, with x # y, are regarded as equivalent if they carry a 
common affect (unconsciously). This means that there is a common affectual response 
to x and y and. in this sense x = y in response although literal identity fails. Primary 
process activity is characterized by declaration of full identity (equality) based on partial 
identity. In fact even x and not x are regarded as (unconsciously) equivalent because 
they share the common affects of not being each other (cf. Freud’s essay Negation, 1925, 
last paragraph where he states “. . . in analysis we never discover a no in the uncon- 
scious.“). Clearly the relaxed associative mechanisms of the primary process are essential 
for creativity. 
However, the creative process has an interface with reality that the dream process 
does not: both processes are set in motion by a real wishful tendency but the resultant 
for dreams need not be realizable in external reality whereas for creativity it must be. 
The class of processes whose objective is to assess reality is termed the secondary pro- 
cess. The use of ordinary logic is an example of this. The primitive levels of primary 
process functioning are unconscious and, appropriately, the most sophisticated levels of 
secondary process functioning are conscious. In general the primary process is nearer 
the unconscious and the secondary nearer the conscious. Normal maturation sees the 
secondary process evolve from the primary in a synergistic way. However it can hap- 
pen-as seen in paranoids--that the secondary process develops with pathological relat- 
edness to the primary. (In such cases the cognitive powers are intact as long as their 
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object is impersonal and when their object is personal these powers regress to the level 
of primary process function.) 
The essential mechanism of creativity is secondary process (reality oriented) evaluation 
of primary process results. More specifically the dreamlike constructs of the primary 
process are evaluated for external realizability by the secondary process. Utilizing prior 
notation, an event sequence for the creative process is identifiable: 
(1) An adaptive demand gives rise to a wish for resolution W where W is defined by 
its cognitive attributes and by its affectual attributes. 
(2) Signiticant affects of W are relocated to a W* where W # W* but W and W* have 
common affects (primary process). 
(3) The cognitive attributes of the W*‘s nearest W are tested for realizability. The 
secondary process (unconsciously) decides this by determining if the cognitive 
attributes of the W*‘s are found in sufficient degree among the memories of known 
objects. 
(4) If the secondary process review fails then (3) is repeated for W*‘s further away 
cognitively from W. Otherwise, the cognitive attributes of the W*‘s rise to con- 
sciousness for secondary process evaluation: they are given (if necessary) syntactic 
relatedness and a reality experiment is conceptualized to resolve those elements 
of the creative response not yet decidable by prior real experience. Typically this 
involves configuring known objects (W*‘s from prior real experience) in a yet 
untested way to decide empirically if such a configuration will work (the affects of 
W as a wish are operative here very clearly). If the test fails either W is redefined 
in a feedback fashion and/or other W*‘s (some further away from W) are tested. 
This continues until the test succeeds or available W*‘s are exhausted and the 
demand is then regarded as irresolvable pro tern. Solution then awaits acquisition 
through experienc of more W*‘s. 
Steps 1-4 are a suitable H* for the given P* and S*. 
Note that this process begins with W*‘s that are cognitively close to W. This is actually 
true of dreaming too, however the distance is increased only as superego constraints 
demand. In creativity, reality constraints (!) increase the distance toward apparently less 
related objects. In both processes the affects of W are preserved through relocation to 
objects W* which have had affects historically in common with W. 
With a little revision H* can be specialized to H: 
(1) W is defined with cognitive attributes { wj} and affectual attributes { aK}; write W 
= {wJ* 
(2) For each a~ define Wk = {wk,} where each wkl is a cognate that has affect ak 
associated with it. As with dreams note that it may happen that wk, $5 W. 
(3) Let WO = U Wk and define d: WO x W --* R, i.e., d(wl,wr) is a real number that 
measures the distance of cognate w1 (among the wk, ‘s) from wp (among the wk’s 
of W). 
(4) For each ak and each wj choose the w k, that minimizes d(wk, ,wj). If there are two 
or more, then admit all such minimizing elements one at a time. 
(5) The resulting set of wk,‘s are compared to the attributes w,, of known objects for 
concurrence (wk, = w,,, for some m). If there is at least one known object (note 
that W is not regarded as a known object) for which a fraction, say p, of the 
wk,‘s are cognitive attributes then the w kl’s are presented as an attribute list of a 
potential solution. Go to (6). If not (4) is repeated by relaxing the minimization 
serially first for w1 then w2, etc. (Relaxation of the minimization means to accept 
the first runner-up for minimum, followed by the second, etc.) If this fails then 
pairs of wf’s are relaxed followed by triples should this fail, etc. If all relaxed 




Repeat (4) till success or p < 0. If p < 0 then there is no solution derivable from 
current memory of object cognitive and affectual attributes. 
The attribute list is listed together with known objects carrying these attributes (to 
within loop%) and verbs used to define W. A statement, not in general unique, is 
found by linking the known objects through these verbs. This statement (achieved 
by human evaluation of the output) is a candidate for a reality test. If it fails modify 
W as appropriate and/or iterate step 5. If no modification of W and/or iteration 
succeeds then this corresponds to p < 0 in step 5. 
Steps l-6 represent H. Step 4 allows generalization to accommodate constraints from 
reality or superego. For reality set d(~,,w,) = CO for suitable cognate pairs and for 
superego constraint do likewise if w Ic, associates too much with affect uk. Note that the 
intuitive linguistic capacity that links nouns through verbs (referred to in step 6) is for- 
mulatable though not outlined here. 
The example to follow was chosen to illustrate the mechanics of steps l-6. It has been 
greatly simplified to assure rapid convergence thus allowing a listing of the recursions. 
Hopefully, the simplifications do not comprise reality so much as to make it a poor 
example. 
Consider a child in a playpen. Outside the pen beyond its reach is an object it wishes 
to fetch. In the pen are a ball, a bottle, and a stick. For simplicity let the set of known 
objects <(to the child) be ball, bottle, stick, hand, and arm (the algorithm would quickly 
reject most other objects). For this problem W = to reach and grasp the object. W has 
cognitive attributes w1 = length, w2 = grasp, w3 = shape, and affectual attributes al = 
mastery, up = curiosity, and a3 = satisfaction. Here, each ak (k = 1,2,3) is associated 
with all the attributes wl (j = 1,2,3) which correspond here to the wk, ‘s. Table 1 itemizes 
how the w,‘s are associated with objects known to the child. Note that only W has all 
attributes wi, w2, and w3. Table 2 summarizes the relative proximities of the w,‘s. These 
distances are ordinal, meaning, for example, that length is more related to shape than to 
grasp or that grasp is more related to shape than length; shape is equally related to length 
and grasp. 
Table 1. Cognitive attributes of known objects 
(WI’S) 
Length GYP Shape 
Ball N N Y 
Bottle N N Y 
Stick Y N Y 
Hand N Y Y 
Arm Y N N 
W Y Y Y 
Table 2. Distances between cognitive attributes 
Length GYP Shape 
Length 0 2 1 
Grasp 2 0 
Shape 1 I ; 
Begin the algorithm with p = 0.85, 6p = 0.1, and bear in mind that arm, hand, and 
stick are obviously the objects in the solution. Items A-D below together with the par- 
agraph after D summarize the iterations. 
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(A) mind(wkl,wl) = 0 which corresponds to length, 
mind(wk,,w2) = 0 which corresponds to grasp, 
mind(wk,,wa) = 0 corresponding to shape; only W has loop% of these attributes 
and W is not a known object. 
(B) Relax the minimization one at a time; 
(wl relaxed) obtain w3, w2, w3, or w2, w2, w3 = grasp, shape; only hand as loop% 
of these attributes. 
(w2 relaxed) obtain wl, w3, w3, or wi, wl, w3 = length, shape; this yields stick. 
(w3 relaxed) obtain wl, w2, wI or wl, w2, w2 = length, grasp; this corresponds to 
no known object. 
(C) Relax the minimization two at a time; 
(wl, w2 relaxed) obtain w3, w3, w3 = shape; this yields ball, bottle, stick, hand; 
also obtain w3, w2, w3 = grasp, shape; this yields hand; also obtain w2, wl, w3 
and w2, w3, w3 which are listed above. 
(wl, w3 relaxed) obtain w3, w2, w1 as above; also w3, w2, w2 as above; also w2, 
w2, w1 as above; and w2, w2, w2 which yields hand. 
(w2, w3 relaxed) obtain wl, w3, w1 as above; also wl, w3, w2 as above; also wl, 
w 1, w 1 which yields arm, stick; also wl, w 1, w2 as above. 
(D) Relax the minimization three at a time to obtain the following triples all of which 
repeat above triples: 
w2. WI, w; W2r WV w2; wz, w3, w,; Wtr w3, w2; 
w3, WI, w1; w3, Wl, wz; w3t w3, w,; w3, w31 w2. 
If p changes, none of the above changes till p = 0.65. However, it is not until p = 0.45 
and w3 is relaxed in the minimization that we obtain as attributes wl, w2, and w1 or length 
and grasp. The known objects having lOOp% of these attributes are stick, hand, and arm. 
The verbs of W are reach and grasp which may be used to link the known objects as arm 
reach (stick), hand grasp (stick), (stick) reach object and grasp. 
This paper does not address mechanizing the linking of the wk,‘s through the verbs of 
W and so a human judgment of the outputs would be necessary. The purpose of the 
example is to illustrate in a simple way the convergence to an obvious solution. 
If the example were real then after adaptation the object stick would have associated 
with it the cognitive attribute grasp as well as all affects which are associated with grasp. 
This fact could be easily generalized and used to augment the present algorithm to an 
evolutionary (ontogenetic) simulation. 
A Fortran implementation of examples 2 and 3 
The algorithms (H) presented above lend themselves readily to programming. Figure 
3 is a flowchart for a Fortran implementation of these algorithms; Fig. 4 is a listing of the 
program itself. This implementation is faithful to the algorithms given except for step 5 
of the algorithm for simulating the creative mechanism. Relaxed minima are here re- 
stricted to being one or two at a time and for each of these only relaxations up to the first 
runner-up for the minimum distance are allowed. 
The implementation given is limited to ten affects, ten cognates, and twenty objects, 
each affect and each object having up to ten cognates as associates (affect) or attributes 
(object). These small numbers serve the purpose of illustration and do not define natural 
limits. Similarly, the numerical data were chosen for appropriateness and clarity of pre- 
sentation (systematic and exhaustive studies of data of this kind are still pending although 
first efforts date back to about 1910 with the association experiments of C. J. Jung and 
E. Bleuler; indeed it is data of this very kind which is among the goals of psychoanalysis). 
The notation in the listing features the variables DREAM, M, NA, NC, NOB, P, DP 
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MINWK 
+ PEVAL ’ ” I i-c RXWORK 
CALL IGNWK 
I NRELUC= NRElAX+l I 
I NREIAX=O P-P- I; P I 
Fig. 3a. The relationship of MAIN 
to subroutines MINWK, PEVAL, 
and RXWORK. 
Fig. 3b. The structure of MAIN. 




OF STEP 4 
Fig. 3c. Subroutine MINWK. 
OBJECT (=IP) 
NUMBER 
Fig. 3d. Subroutine PEVAL. 
ONE AT A TIME 
REJ.AX DISTANCES 
TWO AT A TIME 
Fig. 3e. Subroutine RXWORK. 
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and PSTOP which represent, respectively, a simulate dreams flag (if DREAM = 1 then 
simulate dreaming else simulate creativity), the magnitude criterion of step 4 in dream 
simulation, the number of affects (of W, the wish), the number of cognates (known to 
the subject, not necessarily of W), the number of known objects, the fraction criterion 
of step 5 in creativity, the decrement of p (step 5), and the final value of p for the run. 
The term cognate indicator refers to a binary variable indicating presence or absence of 
a cognate with respect to an affect or object. 
The data for the dream below is given in Fig. 5 which is the output of the simulation. 
‘The dream itself was related to Freud by an adult patient [21: 
“ . . . She dreamed it when she was four years old, and it was this: ‘A fox or a lynx is walking 
about the roof; then something falls down, or she falls down, and after that, her mother is carried 
out of the house-dead’; whereat he dreamer weeps bitterly. I have no sooner informed her that 
this dream must signify a childish wish to see her mother dead, and that it is because of this dream 
that she thinks her relatives must shudder at her, then she furnishes material in explanation of the 
EXTERNAL PEVAL 
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FORMATtlX.‘AFFECT ‘,12,’ Ct-GNATE INOICATI?IRS: ‘r2012) 
FORHATllX,‘CCGPlATE ‘r17.’ DISTANC.eS: ‘elOF5.21 
FCRMAT(lX,‘flRJECT ‘.IZ,’ CflC.NAT5 INOICATORS: ‘,20112) 
FORMAT(IX,‘COCNATE INOICATORS FOR W: ‘12Oltl 
EN0 
Fig. 4. The Fortran source code for an implementation of the algorithms for dream formation and the mechanism 
of creativity. 








C*.W*ENTRY POINT FOR OREAHS. 
5000 DO 5100 K-l.NA 
OLDWI N-O. 
00 52W L=l,NC 
DHINPYO. 
IF~~A~K,LI.Ec.oIGcT~~~~~ 
00 5300 J=l,pT 
IflJ.EO.LIGOTOS3OO 
lFl0l)JLl.Jl.EO.0lWn9S300 





























DO 6500 U=lrNA 
I SAME-NC 
00 6600 J-2,NOR 
HATCH=0 
lFllOREAHlX.JI.EQ.OlGOTO66OO 


















Cm*ON C’~tlo.1~1 *l%iJ. lA(lfl, 101 rNA,NCrNOR.P,Dp 
CD*moN 0REAM.n 
OIAENSlON IAMINtlO, 










DO 100 I*l.NA 
DO 200 J=l.NC 
Ofll N=99. 
IFlOUJll,JI.EO.OlGOTO200 











FORMATI/, AT E2LAXATlCY: ‘.I219 NITH P - ‘eF5.2,’ MINIMIZING ATTR 
1lWfES ARE: ‘rlOl31 
CALL PEVALlIAMIN,lFOUWC1 
lFIlFOUND.EQ.OIYRlTEi6~llOOlP 
FORNAT~~X.~SSSSSNC OKJECT~ fnuN0 AT P =*,f5.2l 
IWNRELAX.E~.~IRETURN 
GOTO 
Fig. 4. continued. 
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SUOROUTINC IXYORKlNRELAX,LAXI 























OYINC rNC I-0. 
LAX=-1 
RETURN 
FIN0 NC OIlCCtS TW AT 4 TINE. 
IF1LAX.GT.INC*lNC-1lI/21GOTO99 
IFlLAX.CT.1lGOtO22S 




















SWJROUTINE PBV4LlMTNS, IFWNOI 
INTEGER 08Jl20.101 




OtMENSlON WINS1 101 
CWNT THE NUM8ER OF OISTINCT OPTIMAL AtlR18UfES. 
TOTATR=O. 
00 50 l=l,NC 
IFlMINSI:I.NE.OlTOtATR~TOTATR+l 
CONTINUE 
FIN0 OSJECT CANOIOATES FOK SOLUTION. 
00 100 U=trN0Ei 
IP-0 











FORNATllX,‘OWECT I ‘1121’ HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES’I 
C ON11 NUE 
RETUKN 
ENO 
Fig. 4. conthwd. 
dream. ‘Lynx-eye’ is an opprobrious epithet which a street boy once bestowed on her when she 
was a very small child; and when she was three years old a brick or tile fell on her mother’s head, 
so that she bled profusely.” 
The output of the simulation is the set of nouns used to represent the affects of the dream 
wish W. These nouns are brick, lynx, and house. The wish W is quoted in the text above. 
Since this simulator does not feature verb synthesis these nouns must be connected 
independently of the simulation but as indicated in the dream and in Freud’s narrative. 
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COGNATES 1.2.3.4 ARE PARPNl,VICTOR~YEAPON,WR4N. 
AffECTS 1.2.3.4 ARE RAGE* JEALOUSY. CONTROL. AND LOVE. 
PARAI+ETERS: OREAII-lq M-.!i. 
PARAMETERS8 NA=4.NC-4,WOB=S.P-0.,OP~O..PSlOP=O. 
~1,2,3.4.S~~~SELf,MOTHER,m)USE,LYNX,BRICU~. 
WFECT 1 COGNATE INCICAtORS: 0 1 10 
ACFECT 2 COGNATE INOICATORS~ 1010 
4ffECT 3 CCGNATE INOICAlORSr 010 1 
APfECT 4 UIGNATE INOICATORSr 1000 
COGNATE 1 OISTANCES: 0.0 2.00 3.00 1.00 
COGNATE 2 DISTANCES8 2.00 0.0 4.00 3.00 
COGNATE 3 DISTANCES: 3.00 4.00 0.0 5.00 
COGNATE 4 DISTANCES: 1.00 3.00 5.00 0.0 
COCNATE IMOICATORS CO4 WI 1 1 1 1 
OBJECT 1 COGNATE INOICATORS: 0 1 1 1 
OBJXT 2 COGNATE INCICATORSr 1101 
OBJECT 3 COGNATE INOICATORS: 1000 
OBJECT 4 COGNATE INCICATORS: 0110 
OBJECT 5 COGNATE INOICATORS: 0010 
&PfFCT I 1 IS REPRESENTED RI CCCNATE I 3 
4ffECT I 2 IS REPRESENTED OV COtN4TE I 3 
AffECT 4 3 IS REPRESENTED IV COGNATE I 2 
APPFCT 4 4 IS REPRESENTED BY COGNATE I 1 
OBJECT 4 5 IS 4 CREIM ELEMENT FOR Aff EC1 1 
OBJFCT 4 5 IS A DREAM ELEMENT FOR AfFFCT 2 
OBJECT 4 4 IS 4 CREAU ELFMENT FOR AFFECT 3 
OBJECT I 3 IS 4 DREAM ELEMENT FOR AFFECT 4 
Fig. 5. Simulation of Freud’s “lynx-eye” dream. 
The data for the illustration of simulating creativity was given in Tables 1 and 2. Figure 
6 is the beginning section of output for this problem and it again itemizes the data. The 
object water with cognitive attribute wetness has been added to demonstrate how the 
algorithm rejects irrelevant objects (water is never cited as an element of the solution). 
The output is lengthy and therefore only the first page with this data as well as the page 
where the elements of the solution appear are given in that figure. These elements are 
cited at relaxation 1 with p = 0.45 as object numbers 3, 4, and 5 which correspond to 
stick, hand, and arm. 
A final illustration will exhibit the difference in structure between dream and creativity 
simulation. Here the same wish-to be detailed below-is used to drive the simulation 
both of dreams and of creativity. Figure 7 presents the data and that page of output’for 
creativity where the (appropriate) elements of a solution are presented (these being object 
numbers 1, 2, 3, and 6 which occur at relaxation 0 with p = 0.4). Here again the output 
is lengthy and therefore only the relevant pages are given. Note that Fig. 7a summarizes 
dream simulation and Fig. 7b creativity simulation. 
This illustration is a hypothetical reconstruction of the invention of the chain. Consider 
at an historical time prior to the chain’s invention a property owner frustrated by the 
inability of a rope to block passage along a path onto his property. This rope prior to its 
ruin joined the tips of two posts planted at the edges of the path. The wish W of a person 
in this hypothetical circumstance might be stated: W = to join the posts with another 
kind of rope strong enough to be an effective obstacle. 
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COGNATES 1.2.3.4 ARE LENGTH. GRASP, SHAPE. AH0 WETNESS. 




AFFECT I CGGNATE lNOlC4TORS: 11 10 
AFFECT 2 COGNATE INOlCPTORSr 11 10 
AFFECT 3 CCGNATE INO~CATORS: 1110 
COGNATE 1 OISTANCES: 0.0 2.00 1.00 3.00 
COGNATE 2 DISTANCES: 2.00 0.0 1.00 3.oa 
COGNATE 3 OISTANCES: 1.00 1.00 0.0 3.00 
COGNATE 4 01 STANCESr 3.00 3 ‘. 
1 COGNATE lNOlC4TONJ FCR Y1 1 
OWECT 1 COGNATE lNOlCATORS: 
OBJECT 2 COGNATE lNOlCATORS: 
OBJECT 3 CGGNATE INOICATORSI 
OEJECT 4 CCtNATE 1NOlCATORSs 
CGJECT 5 COGNATE lNOlCATORSI 
OGJECT 6 COGNATe tNOlCAtORS1 
AT RELAXATIGN: 0 YIW P = 0.8s MlNfNltlNG 4TTUlRUTtS ARE: 
SJSS4NC OGJECTS FOUNO AT P l Oeb5 
AT RELAXAT IONr 
OBJECT I 4 HAS 
1 YITH P = 0.85 MlNlNl2lNO ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
lOOP? OF PTTRIGUTES 
AT RELPX4TltIN: 
O8JECT I 3 HAS 
1 WITH P l 0.15 NININILING ATTRlRUT2S A*E! 




OGJECT I 1 HAS 
CXJECT I 2 HAS 
OBJECT I 3 144s 
OGJECT a 4 n4s 
1 UITH P - 0.85 WlNlMlZlNG ATTPIBUTES ARE! 
1 YITW P . 0.05 MlNlMlLlNt ATTPIBUTES ARE: 
2 YITH P * 0.85 ~INlMltlNG 4TV IGIJTES ACEI 
lOOPI OF ATTRISUTES 
lOOPI OF ATT0 IINJTES 
lOOPt @F ATTRIBUTES 
lOOPI OF ATTRIXUTES 
AT RELAX4TION: 
AT R~LAxITI~N: 
ORJECT I 4 HAS 
2 UITH P - 0.85 CllNlPltlNG 4TTPlRUTES APC: 
2 WITH P - 0.65 MlNlNlZlNG 4TTR IRIITES &RF: 
taOPX OF ATTRIOUTES 
AT RELCX4710N: 2 WITH P * a..95 HlN1NlZ1NC ATTPIBUTES 4REr 
n9JECT 1 3 WAS LOOPI OF 4TTRlBUTCS 
AT RELAXATION: 2 *lTt4 P . 0.85 ~IYl~ILl~lG ATTPIRUTES AUF: 








41 RELAXATION: 0 UITH P - 0.4s RlN1NltlNG ATTPIGUTES ARE: 
OGJECT I 3 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIIUTES 
OWECT I 4 HAS lOOPt OP ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATlONr 1 YITH P - 0.45 ~lNl~lLlNG ATTPIWTES ARE: 
OBJECT I 1 HAS loOPI OF ATTRIGUTES 
OIJECT # 2 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIOUTES 
OGJECT # 3 HAS lOOPt OF 4TtRl8UTES 
OIJECT # 4 HIS lOOPt Of ATTNIGUTES 
AT RELAXATVJN: 1 YITN P I 0.45 NINIRIZING ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
OEJECT l 1 HAS lOOP? OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT I) 2 HAS lOOPt CF 4TTRl5UTEf 
OIJEC? I 3 MAS lOOPI Cc ATTRIBUTES 
OGJECT I 4 NAS lOOPt Of ATTXIGUTES 
OWECT I 5 HAS 1GOPx Of ATTRIBUTES 
AT AELAXATlONr 1 YITW P = 0.45 UlNlNlZlNG ATTPIBUTES ARE: 
OGJECT L 3 NAS lOOPt Olc ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT I 4 HAS lOOPI OP 4TTRlBUTlS 
OBJECT # 5 HAS lOOPt OP ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAX4TlON: 1 YITN P * 0.45 MlNlM!ZlNG ATTRlBUTFS AREt 
r)WECT I 3 HAS lOOPt OP ATTRlBUTES 
OBJECT I 4 NAS LOOP1 OF ATTRIIUTES 
123 0 
0 2 3 0 
10 3 3 
12 0 0 
12 3 0 
0 0 3 0 
I2 3 n 
0 2 1 II 
LO 3 0 
10 3 fl 
1230 
0 2 3 0 
1 0 3 0 
1 2 0 0 
1 2 3 0 
Fig. 6. Simulation of the illustration of Example 3 (child in a playpen). (Note: relaxation number refers to how 
many variables are being relaxed-here limited to 0, 1, or 2.) 
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AT RELAxATIL*(: 2 WITH P = 0.45 MtNtNIZING ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
OBJECT A I HAS LOOPS Of ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 2 HAS lOOPI OP ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 3 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 4 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 WtTH P l 0.45 NINIMIZING ATTPIWTES ARE: 
OBJECT A 3 HAS 100PX OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 4 HAS lOOP¶ OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RCLAXATIDN: 2 YITH P = 0.45 FINIMIZING ATTPIBUTES ARE: 
OBJECT A 1 HAS iOOPl OF ATTRIBUTES 
CBJFCT A 2 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT I 3 HAS lOOP? OF ATTRIBUTES 
@BJECT A 4 WAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATIONr 2 UITN P = 0.45 HINtMIZING ATTPIRUTES ARE: 
OBJECT a 1 HAS LDOPX OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 2 MAS lOOPt DF ATTRIRUTES 
OBJECT ” 3 MAS IOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
CBJECT A 4 HAS 1OOPl OF ATTRIBUTES 
flBJECT I 5 HAS lOOPI Df ATTR1BUTC.S 
AT RELAXATIDN: 2 Y1TN P = 0.45 FINIMIZINC ATTFlRUTES AOE: 
OBJECT A 1 HAS lOOPt OF ATTRIBUTES 
OEJECT A 2 HAS IOOPI OF ATTRIEUTES 
OBJECT A 3 HAS 1OOPX CF ATTRIRUTES 
OBJECT A 4 HAS lOOPt DF ATTR1RlJTES 
OBJECT A 5 HAS 1OOFX OF ATTRIWTES 
AT RELAXATIC’N: 2 WITH P = 0.45 ‘4INI~lZlNG ATTFI9llTES APC: 
DBJECT A 3 IIAS IOOP? DF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 4 HAS lOOPt DF ATTRIBUTES 
OEJECT 0 S HAS LOOPT ‘)F ATTRIBUTES 
Fig. 6. continued. 
0 0 3 0 
1 2 3 0 
0 2 3 0 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 3 0 
1 2 n n 
COGNATES 1 TO 7 ARE LENCTN~TIPPEO,STRON6,NOCDCN.FLEXIBLE,LtNtTEO,JDtNEO. 




AFFECT 1 COGNATE INOtCATORSt 1010000 
AFFECT 2 COGNATE INOICATORS: 0010000 
AFFECT 3 CDCNATE tNOICATORS: 0000011 
COGNATE 1 DISTANCES: 0.0 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 
COGNATE 2 DISTANCES: 4.00 0.0 4.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 
COGNATE 3 DISTANCES: 2.00 4.00 0.0 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 
COGNATE 4 OISTANCES: 2.00 3.00 I.00 0.0 1.00 4.00 1.00 
COGNATE S DISTANCES: 3.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.0 s.00 3.00 
CDGNATE b DISTANCES: 5.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 0.0 4.00 
COGNATE 7 DtSTANCESr 2.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 0.0 
COGNATE IKOICATORS FOR U: 1010111 
OBJECT 1 CIlGNATE tNDICATORS: 
OBJECT 2 COGNATE INDICATORSI 
OBJECT 3 CDGNATE tNOICATDRS: 
OBJECT 4 COGNATE INOICATORS: 
OBJECT 5 COGNATE INCICATDRS: 
OBJECT b CCGNATE INCICATORS: 








AFFECT I 1 IS REPRESENTED BY 
AFFECT A 2 IS REPRESENTED BY 
AFFECT A 3 IS REPRESENTED BY 
COGNATE A 1 
COGNATE f 3 
COGNATE f 6 
OBJECT A 4 IS A DREAM ELENENT FOR AFFECT 1 
OBJECT f S IS A DREAM ELEMENT FCR AFFECT 2 
OBJECT A 7 IS A CREAM ELENENT FOR AFFECT 3 
7a. Simulating a dream associated with the wish that leads to the invention of the chain. Fig. 
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CCGNATFS 1 TO 7 APF LEYCT~rlIPPEO,SlPONS~U~~~f~,FLfXlRLE,LlMI~E~,JO~NE~. 
AFFECTS 1.2.3 APE COkTROL, ANGER, AN@ ‘ISAPPClNT*ENT. 
PARAMETERS: I)REAM=O. M-0.0. 
PARAMETSRS : NA-3,~C=7,NOO=7.P=,9.OP=.I~PSTOP=.2. 
I I 2 3 4 5.6r7l-~PPST,~OPE,SPINE~PENIORSTACLE,RlNG,PARC~HENTl. , . l . 
AFFFCT L COGNA rE INOICAlORS: 1010000 
AFFECT 2 CCGNATE INOICAfORS: 0010000 
AFFECT 3 COGNATE INOICATORS: 0000011 
CCGNATE 1 01 STANCES: 0.0 4.00 2.00 2.UO 3.00 5.30 t.no 
COGNATE 2 DISTANCES: 4.00 0.0 4.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 
CCGNATE 3 OISTANCES: 2.00 4.00 0.0 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 
COGNATE 4 01 STANCES: 2.w 3.00 1.00 0.0 1.09 4.00 1.oo 
COGNATE 5 CISTANCES: 3.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.0 5.00 3.00 
CCGNATE 6 01 STANCES: S.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 0.0 4.00 
COGNATE 7 DISTANCES: 2.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 0.0 
CEGNATE INOICATORS FOR V: 1010111 
OBJECT 1 CCGNATC INCICATORS: 11l0000 
OAJKT 2 COGNATE INOICATORS: 1001110 
OI.lECl 3 COGNATE INOICATORSt 1010101 
OBJECT 4 COGNATE INOICATORS: 1100000 
I-JGJECT 5 COGNATE INOICATORS: 0010000 
OBJECT 6 CCGNATE INCICATORS: 0010010 







1 UITH P = 0.90 ~lN:WlZlNG ATTPIRUTES ARE: 
FCIJNC AT P = 0.90 
AT RELAXATION: 
SSSSSNC OBJECTS 
1 WITH P = 0.90 MlNIHlZlNG ATTRIRUTES ARE: 
CCUNC AT P = 0.90 
LT RELAXATlflN: 1 WITHP l 0.90 llNIMlZlNG ATTRIRUTES ARE: 
SSSSShC ORJECTS FOUND AT P = 0.90 
AT RELAXATlON: 1 UITHP = 0.90 RINlHIZlNG ATTRIRUTES ARE: 
ISSWLC CRJFCTS FCUNC 4T P = 0.90 
Al PELAXATIONI 
OBJECT I 3 HAS 
lUITHP- 0.90 MINIWlZlNG ATTP-,lBUTES ARE: 
lOOPI CF ATTRIBUTES 
AT PELAXATION: 
4T RELAXATION: 
lYITMP= 0.90 MINIl’lZING ATTRl8UlES ARE: 1030067 
2 UIW P = O.YO CINIPIZING AVPIRUTES ARE: 1030067 
0 YITH P = 0.90 MINIMIZING ATTPIRUTES ARE: 
FCUNC AT P = 0.90 
1 UITH P - 0.90 NlNl~lLlNG sTTRIRUTES ARE: 
FOUNO AT P = 0.90 
AT RELAXATION: 2 WITH P - O.SO MINIMIZING ATTRlBUTES ARE: 
ORJECT I 3 HAS LOOPI OF ATTRl8UlES 
AT RCCAXATION: 2 WITH P * O.SO ~lNIMlLING ATTPIBUTFS ARE: 
OBJECT R 1 HAS LOOP2 OF ATTRIIUTES 
OBJECT R 3 HA.5 LOOPS OF ATTRXWTES 
AT PELAXATION: zYITHP= 
OWFCT R 
O.SO MINIMlZING ~TTRIOUTES ARE: 
3 HAS lOOPt OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 YITH P - 0.50 CINlMlZlNG ATTPIEUTES ARE% 
OIJECT I 3 HAS LOOP8 OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 WITH P - O.SO MINlMlZlNG ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
OEJFCT I 3 HAS LOOPS OF ATTRIWTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2ntTMp= 0.50 MINI PIZING ATTP IBUTES AAEt 
DEJECT I 1 IiAS LOOPI Of ATTPIfJUTES 
OIJCCT I 3 HAS LOOPS OF ATTRl9UTES 
At RELAXATlm: 2 UITn P - O.SO YINIMIZING AT’RIIUTES ARE: 
OBJECT I 3 HAS LOOPX OF ATTRIWTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 YITN P = 0.50 ItlNlMlZING ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
















Fig. 7b. Simulating the hypothetical creation of the concept of the chain. 
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AT RELIXATIIJN: 2 WITH P * 0.50 ~INIWIL1NG ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
OlJECT I 1 HAS lOOPI OF AltUlBUlES 
OBJECT II 3 HAS lOoPI OF ATTRIWTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 WITH P . 0.50 llINIWIZING ATTPIWTES ARE: 
OBJECT A 3 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT PELAXATIOrt: 2 WITH P . 0.50 RINIWIZING ATTPIBUTES ARE: 
OBJECT I 1 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIIUTES 
OCJECT I 3 HAS IOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATII%: 2 YITH P = 0.30 rlINII’IZING ATTPI8IJlES APE: 
OPJECT A 3 HAS lOOPI DF ATTR1BUTES 
AT RELAXATION: 2 WITH P - 0.30 NINIPILlNG ATTPIfWTES ARE: 
03JECT A 3 t+AS lOOP¶ OF ATTRIMJTES 
AT RELAXATION: 0 WITH P I 0.40 *INIMIZING ATTRIRIJTES ARFI 
MJECT I 1 HAS lOOPt OF ATTRICIUTES 
OGJECT A 2 HAS LOOP3 (IF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 3 HAS lOOPI OF A.rTRIEiUTES 
OBJECT A 6 HAS lOOPI OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT PELAXATKIN: 1 WITH P . 0.40 “INICIZING ATTPlBUTES ARE: 
OBJCCT I 1 HAS lOOPt OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT I 2 HAS lOOPt OF ATTRIBUTES 
OBJECT A 3. WAS IOOP? OF ATTRIRUTES 
DEJECT I 6 HAS lOOF OF ATTRIBUTES 
AT RELAXATION: 1 YITH P = 0.40 YINlFlZING ATTRIBUTES ARE: 
OCJECT g 1 MAS lOOPt OF ATTRIBUTES 
CBJECT I 2 WAS lOOPt OF ATT91RUTEs 









The simulated dream elements that result from this wish are pen, obstacle, and parch- 
ment. The pen is accountable for as a distortion of tipped posts; the parchment being 
derived from wood shares attributes with the rope; obstacle is self-defining and may be 
amorphous. A dream that could reasonably account for the required wish fulfillment 
might be: a pen wrote on a parchment a (legal) obstacle to passage. Or, more graphically: 
one in authority (the self) wrote a decree barring passage. 
However, the output for creativity simulation is different. The output is at most object 
numbers 1 or 3 (post or spine) until relaxation 0 with p = 0.4 where object numbers 1, 
2, 3, and 6 are given. These object numbers correspond to post, rope, spine, and ring. 
These may be linked through the verbs of the wish (which are to join and to be) as 
follows: 
join rings; join posts (with result); 
or more elaborately: 
a spine is joined rings; a spine is rope(like); joined rings are rope(like); join the posts 
with joined rings. 
It is clear in the above examples that these simulations would be greatly enhanced by a 
verb synthesizing algorithm. Hopefully, the modest simulations outlined here capture 
enough of the adaptive mechanisms of dreaming and creativity to suggest the relevance 
of the analytic personality model to the goals of artificial intelligence. 
Summary 
It may be worthwhile when investigating design approaches to adaptive devices to 
consider the models of analytic psychology as candidates for a prototype. While not a 
completely developed science it has a variety of structured models for human adaptive 
functioning which may be emulatable perhaps via the approach suggested here. 
The technology of intelligent devices seems to be maturing from problem specific 
designs to devices which feature a more general problem solving capability. Such elas- 
ticity of function is precisely human. And so while cognitive models have marvelously 
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served the resolution of specific problems in systems science it is conceivable that analytic 
models can serve the resolution of elastically defined problems. This approach is infor- 
mational in the sense previously suggested and not literal as in bionics where physico- 
chemical attributes are replicated. It is worthwhile to bear in mind that in this model all 
human behavior serves the purpose of securing adaptation. Therefore, although the re- 
sults of the creative process may be askew in the pathological, nevertheless the concept 
of creativity subsumes all human response. It follows that no human contrivance can be 
without the attributes of the mechanism of this process. This is, in the author’s opinion, 
a strong argument in favor of utilizing mechanistic psychological models-such as the 
analytic one-as inevitable prototypes for design of adaptive devices. Indeed if the human 
mind did conceive an adaptive device that worked with principles other than those man 
uses it would still be a result of the creative process and still the attributes of such a 
device would derive from those of the mechanism of adaptive response: there is no real 
departure from our own structure in our inventiveness even when we conceive objects 
that we are not. 
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